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Introduction
The delegitimization of the public sphere implies that decent 
people should avoid politics, or enter them only grudgingly, on 
the grounds that “someone has to do the dirty work.”
—Ghia Nodia, 2002
With the goal of unpacking the consequences of foreign-
led empowerment of civil society, a pilot program was con-
ducted through an international democracy promotion 
NGO during the 2008 Georgian parliamentary elections. 
The intent of the program was to increase civic engagement 
and deter voter fraud by providing Georgian citizens with 
information on (a) how to file a formal complaint and (b) 
how an individual could monitor and change the voter reg-
istry. Programs were implemented in randomly selected 
voting precincts, which allowed for the gold standard in 
program evaluation methodology: a randomized controlled 
experiment. The pilot program increased citizen activism, 
evidenced by a 12% rise in registered complaints and a 
moderate increase in voter registration.
While the intervention worked as intended, examina-
tion of the information campaign’s effects on electoral out-
comes revealed an unexpected result: precincts randomly 
selected for the “complaints” intervention had 5% lower 
voter turnout than those that received no treatment. For 
every person contacted, at least one person stayed home on 
election day. In two separate replications of this result, 
precincts that were randomly selected for a 2008 or 2010 
pre-election panel survey—even if they received no addi-
tional contact with the NGO—had a voter turnout about 
3% lower than precincts where no data were gathered. In 
all three experiments, relatively innocuous interventions 
induced voter abstention. Given that these interventions 
are representative of standard methodologies used in 
democracy promotion activities and social scientific 
inquiry more generally, an in-depth exploration of these 
unexpected findings may shed light on important and 
under-reported political processes unfolding in the shadow 
of democracy promotion aid.
An individual’s decision to turn out to vote on election 
day is typically modeled as a minimally costly action with 
few direct benefits.1 Since rationalist approaches to turnout 
typically depend on non-material inducements (i.e. “expres-
sive” benefits) to explain aggregate electoral participation, it 
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is plausible that in the Georgian case a small increase in 
negative emotions—fear or disgust—on the part of study 
respondents might have tipped the scales against participa-
tion among some voters on election day. In semi-authoritar-
ian contexts, some citizens believe that regimes can monitor 
individual voting decisions and use the results to tailor retal-
iations.2 As a result, many post-Soviet elections resemble 
“rituals of consent” (“voting in order to be seen voting by 
anyone who might be interested in keeping track of who is 
voting”) rather than exercises in preference aggregation.3 
These fears are not subject to easy falsification. They are 
akin to a conspiracy theory, which can vary in potency 
across different electoral districts within the same state or 
county. We hypothesize that whether a Georgian voter 
turned out to participate in the 2008 or 2010 election hinged 
on individuals’ self-assessment of two factors: (a) whether 
the regime was capable of monitoring his or her vote choice, 
and (b) potential personal costs of retaliation for voting for 
the opposition. Our suspicion is that our intervention trig-
gered risk aversion behaviors: staying home on election day.
An alternative hypothesis to regime surveillance is dis-
enchantment with politics in general, as suggested by the 
epigraph to this paper. Randomization of the content of a 
2010 pre-election survey found that refusal to voluntarily 
supply information was more common the more “political” 
the survey instrument was. This finding was especially 
acute in precincts rife with mistrust of regime intentions. 
Perhaps citizens feared that the data being collected would 
be somehow used against them. Or perhaps respondents see 
politics as intrinsically “dirty,” and viewed the activities of 
the foreign-assisted youth who arrived from the capital 
with some mix of pity and disgust. Regardless of the pre-
cise mechanism, these findings draw attention to a possible 
source of bias in much of the survey data collected in semi-
authoritarian regimes on politically sensitive subjects.
Local context: The Georgian case
Georgia is a post-Soviet state that enjoys an unusually 
strong strategic relationship with the United States. It 
receives more Western aid per capita than the rest of the 
states in the region combined.4 In 2003, peaceful protests 
swept Eduard Shevardnadze and his regime from power 
when exit polls did not match official vote tallies.5 In the 
wake of the “Rose Revolution,” the next president, Mikheil 
Saakashvili, allowed the Soros Foundation, NDI, IRI, 
Transparency International, and various other democracy 
promotion organizations freedom of action.
At the time of the study Saakashvili’s party, the United 
National Movement (UNM), dominated the political land-
scape by using formal institutions—notably the judiciary, 
the Ministry of Interior, and Parliament—to discourage 
electoral alternatives.6 As president, Saakashvili enjoyed 
favorable media coverage and free time on state television 
networks. In a pre-election survey conducted in the lead-up 
to the 2008 parliamentary election, 32% of voters reported 
that people had to “vote a certain way to keep their jobs.” An 
additional 34% of voters admitted that this happens “some-
times.”7 For all the disappointments of the post-Rose 
Revolution era, however, Saakashvili’s decision to concede 
electoral defeat to Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream 
party in 2012 represents the clearest example of a party in 
post-Soviet Eurasia losing an election and voluntarily step-
ping down from power.8
Two facets of the 2008 Parliamentary election deserve 
special note. First, the election was conducted in an atmos-
phere of paranoia and conspiracy. Many voters believed 
the integrity of the secret ballot was compromised. It was 
taken for granted by Georgian media outlets that authori-
ties could figure out how constituents voted, and tailor 
rewards or punishments accordingly.9 This is borne out in 
survey data. According to a nationally representative 
household survey conducted in the Spring of 2009, only 
50.1% of voters believed that their vote was secret in last 
Georgian election—a far lower figure than was reported 
for the same question in either Armenia (72.8%) or 
Azerbaijan (62.8%).10 Second, little distinguished the vari-
ous opposition parties in terms of ideology or policy pro-
posals. Voters generally went to the polls to either affirm or 
reject the status quo—to either vote vote for or against 
Saakashvili’s UNM party.
Program evaluation: Expected and 
unexpected findings
In the weeks leading up to the 2008 parliamentary elections, 
the authors worked with an international democracy promo-
tion NGO to randomize the precincts that would receive a 
voter information program. The goal of this pilot program 
was to educate Georgian citizens about common technolo-
gies of electoral fraud and—it was hoped—to deter voter 
fraud by disseminating accurate information about how to 
file an anonymous complaint. With the aid of the imple-
menting organization, we tailored the content of the mes-
sage to address types of fraud regularly reported to be 
associated with Georgia’s electoral environment. The pro-
gram was implemented by the Caucasus Research Resource 
Centers (CRRC). The total program budget was just under 
$10,000. Eligible precincts were those previously selected 
as primary sampling units in a national panel survey on the 
2008 parliamentary elections. Canvassers delivered the 
message several weeks after the first wave of the survey. To 
increase efficiency, precincts were grouped in blocks of 
four, based on region, urban or rural, 2006 governing party’s 
vote share, and percentage of ballots cast between 5:00 p.m. 
and 8:00 p.m. in the previous election, which election 
observers use as a rough proxy of voter fraud (since ballot 
stuffing tended to occur at the end of the day). Within these 
blocks of four, two precincts were randomly selected to 
receive the intervention.
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Description of intervention
The pilot program studied an intervention designed to 
encourage voters to report any observed problems on elec-
tion day to either local electoral officials or to well-known 
NGO partners (with experience in election monitoring).11 
The messages were delivered through a combination of 
pamphleting and canvassing. In every treatment precinct, 
approximately 30 households were visited by canvassers 
and given a face-to-face oral message and a flier. Canvassers 
also distributed fliers to roughly 80 additional households 
in the precinct (2–3 neighbors per home selected). Given 
that average precinct size in the experimental samples is 
1151 voters and assuming an average of 2 voting age adults 
in each household,12 we would have directly exposed about 
20% of households to the message. The canvassers were 
college students recruited from Tbilisi universities. Most 
enumerators had substantial survey administration experi-
ence and training through the CRRC. The text of the mes-
sages are in the appendix.
Expected results: Enhanced civic activism 
against electoral malfeasance
The intent of the “Complaints” intervention was to encour-
age voters to monitor local elections themselves, filing a 
grievance if election regulations were violated. To check if 
our intervention had this effect, we compiled data on com-
plaints of electoral malfeasance reported by prominent 
election monitoring organizations. We use two dependent 
variables: (a) a dummy variable for at least one complaint 
filed by a voter in that precinct and (b) the raw number of 
complaints filed. Results are presented in Table 1. We find 
strong evidence that our intervention increased the propen-
sity of voters to challenge voting procedures on election 
day. The mean difference across treatment and control for 
the complaints dummy implies a 12% increase in the prob-
ability of a complaint being filed in treated districts. For the 
models using the raw number of complaints, the point esti-
mate is 0.26—which is roughly twice the mean number of 
complaints filed in all precincts in the sample.
Unexpected downstream results: Turnout 
suppression
Subsequent investigation of the data revealed another find-
ing: a substantial number of Georgians did not cast their 
votes on election day in districts selected for the 
“Complaints” treatment, as seen in Table 2. The average 
effect of the complaints treatment (unadjusted specifica-
tion) on voter turnout is about –5.4%. We find a positive, 
Table 1. The average treatment effect of the complaints treatment on whether or not any complaint was made and the number of 
complaints in the 2008 elections. For covariate adjusted results, the adjustment variables are the number of registered voters, 2006 
turnout, and 2006 vote share of the ruling party. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and account for blocking.
Complaints dummy Total complaints
1 2 3 4
Complaints treatment 0.12b 0.12b 0.26a 0.26b
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09)
Covariates  
N 84 84 84 84
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
aSignificant at p<.05.
bSignificant at p<.01.
Table 2. The average treatment effect of the complaints treatment on turnout and the vote share of the ruling party. For covariate 
adjusted results, the adjustment variables are number of registered voters, 2006 turnout, and 2006 vote share of the ruling party. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and account for blocking.
Turnout (%) Pres. Vote (%)
1 2 3 4
Complaints treatment –5.44a –5.27a 0.51 1.42
 (2.57) (2.10) (2.81) (2.03)
Covariates  
N 84 84 84 84
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
aSignificance at p<0.05.
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but small, difference in the ruling party’s vote share (model 
3 and 4), though the null hypothesis of no difference could 
not be not rejected at conventional levels.13 This unex-
pected finding prompted additional investigation.
Turnout suppression effects of two 
pre-election surveys
Given that the turnout dependent variable was not pre- 
specified prior to the experiment’s implementation, skep-
tics could reasonably dismiss the turnout suppression find-
ing as a statistical fluke. This section presents two partial 
replications of the result, wherein two pre-election surveys 
are treated as randomized interventions. Subcontracted 
Georgian canvassers capital city visited randomly selected 
precincts, asking standard questions about political beliefs 
a few weeks before two separate elections. The 2008 and 
2010 CRRC surveys had a multi-stage sampling structure, 
with precincts as the primary sampling units. In 2008, prior 
to the parliamentary elections, 85 precincts were selected 
out of a total of 3019 precincts using sampling probabilities 
(pii )  proportional to the number of registered voters. Using 
a virtually identical sampling procedure in the weeks prior 
to the 2010 local elections, 110 precincts were selected as 
primary sampling units for a similar political survey. The 
unit of analysis for this “experiment” is the precinct and the 
treatment is selection into the sample. To recover the aver-
age treatment effect of being included in the survey sample 
on turnout and regime vote share, we fit a weighted linear 
model of each dependent variable on a treatment indicator 
variable and the selection variable, the number of regis-
tered voters. The weights are inverse probability weights, 
where the weight for each treatment unit is equal to 
1
pi
  and 
the weight for each control unit is 1
1−pi
. Because the selec-
tion weights are known, incorporating these weights in our 
estimation procedure allow us to recover unbiased treat-
ment effect estimates.14 Balance statistics for this design 
are presented in the Appendix.
The results are reported in Table 3. In both the 2008 par-
liamentary election and the 2010 local elections, being ran-
domly selected for a pre-election survey had a statistically 
significant voter suppression effect. The suppression effect 
was slightly more acute in 2008 than in 2010 (a lower turn-
out of approximately 3% compared to a lower turnout of 
approximately 2.5%). The results are consistent with the 
effects of the complaints intervention reported in Table 2.
Potential mechanisms
Why did the three interventions lower turnout? The inter-
ventions could have lowered turnout either by changing the 
behavior of Georgian voters or the functioning of the elec-
tions themselves. In the latter scenario, exposure to the 
information or survey intervention could have deterred 
would-be ballot stuffers, thus reducing the number of man-
ufactured voters and consequently reducing measured turn-
out. Ballot-stuffing and tabulation manipulation are 
prevalent in the South Caucasus.15 In the 2008 election, 
however, European election monitors observed only one 
instance of ballot stuffing and the ballot counting proce-
dures were generally assessed “positively” (OSCE, 2008: 
7). Under this scenario, political operatives—typically 
allied with the ruling regime—would interpret the interven-
tions as increasing the probability of being caught and pun-
ished for breaking the law, thus deterring electoral 
manipulation. According to this hypothesis, one would 
expect the vote share for the president’s party to decrease in 
treatment precincts, as ballot stuffers would no longer gen-
erate the same number of votes for the ruling party. The 
evidence for this implication of the fraud dampening mech-
anism is equivocal. The point estimates of the effect of the 
complaints intervention (Table 2) on the vote share of the 
presidential party is positive (albeit not statistically signifi-
cant), while the effects of the survey (Table 3) are indeed 
negative (again not significant). Furthermore, it is not clear 
why a precinct being selected as a primary sampling unit 
for a survey would reduce ballot stuffing, since enumera-
tors were deployed several weeks before the election and 
did not present themselves as election observers. Given the 
weak theoretical rationale for attributing reduced ballot 
stuffing to the “survey as an experiment” intervention and 
the null results on regime party vote share, the case for this 
mechanism is tenuous.
Table 3. “Survey as an Experiment.”
Turnout % Pres. Party vote %
2008 2010 2008 2010
Estimate –3.09 –2.51 –0.03 –2.16
SE 1.47 1.38 0.02 1.84
95% CI (–5.97, –0.21) (–5.22, 0.2) (–0.07, 0.01) (–5.76, 1.45)
N 2994 3101 2994 3101
This table shows the estimated effects of a precinct being included in two different political surveys. The first survey was conducted immediately 
before the 2008 parliamentary election. The second survey was carried out before the 2010 local elections. Treatment effect estimates account for 
unequal probability of selection and control for precinct size, the variable used to sample precincts into the “treatment”.
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Our favored explanation for the findings is that the inter-
ventions lowered the propensity of some Georgian citizens 
to vote. Being surveyed has been shown to affect consumer 
behavior (Zwane et al., 2011) in a variety of contexts and 
several cognitive mechanisms such as self-prediction and 
related priming effects have been proposed as explanations 
(Rogers et al., 2013). The particular characteristics of the 
Georgian political environment, however, suggest an alter-
native mechanism for our findings on voter behavior: 
increased suspicion of regime surveillance, induced by the 
unexpected arrival of survey enumerators, reduced political 
participation. This mechanism is plausible given the wide-
spread disbelief in the secrecy of the ballot and the common 
view that the government punishes political opponents. 
Citizens in post-Soviet Georgia—many of whom came of 
age in a totalitarian state—may misconstrue enumerators 
from the capital asking about politically sensitive issues as 
agents of the state seeking to gather information about their 
political sympathies. These types of fears are frequently 
expressed by Georgian opposition leaders. For example, in 
2009, a Georgian opposition legislator claimed that
telephone calls have been made … to people from a number 
which is registered to a division of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs … An unidentified individual was conducting a survey 
from this number, asking whether or not they were planning to 
attend the 9 April rally, whether they stood in solidarity with 
[participants of] the rally and whether they would change their 
mind if the opposition used weapons [at the rally].
(BBC, n.d.)
If visits by enumerators prime these sorts of fears, it is 
plausible that even a small increase in the perceived risk to 
the voter or her family could tip the scales against participa-
tion on election day.
Some evidence for this mechanism can be observed by 
examining how treatment effects in the original “com-
plaints” experiment vary by perceptions of the prevalence 
of electoral coercion, as well as the geographic location of 
the precinct. We examined three main interactions: urban 
precincts versus rural precincts, prevalence of employer 
pressure to vote, and the degree to which employers pres-
sured employees to campaign.16 If the intervention was 
indeed being interpreted as political monitoring, then we 
would expect that the effect would be largest in rural areas 
where machine politics is more entrenched. The qualitative 
literature suggests that employment, particularly in the 
public sector, is often used to mobilize supporters. To that 
end, we examined whether, as expected, the monitoring 
effect was largest in areas where survey respondents 
reported that employer political pressure was highest. We 
also check whether effect estimates are larger in areas 
where employers are perceived to place undue pressure on 
workers to participate in a campaign.17
The results can be found in Figure 1. The treatment 
effects all vary in the expected directions, though only one 
interaction—perhaps not surprising giving the low sample 
size—is statistically significant. The intervention had a 
larger suppression effect in rural areas, as expected. But 
particularly striking is the “employer pressure to vote” 
interaction, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. 






















Figure 1. Heterogenous treatment effects: Heterogeneity in the effect of the complaints treatment on voter turnout by three 
variables. ATE in each covariate strata is from a linear model with block fixed effects and adjusted for covariates. Standard errors 
are heteroskedasticity consistent.
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In areas where relatively few survey respondents believed 
that employer pressure to vote for particular parties was 
widespread, the estimated effect on turnout is close to 0. In 
areas with a high number of people citing employer pres-
sure as widespread, the effect estimate is –12.7%. 
Cumulatively, these patterns in the data provide suggestive 
evidence that the intervention was interpreted by opposi-
tion voters as a signal that there would be increased regime 
attention to their voting behavior on election day.
Politicized data collection and  
non-response in 2010
In order to probe the mechanism further, we implemented a 
survey experiment in the 2010 pre-election survey. Our 
new question: Is the behavioral response of Georgian citi-
zens to a survey instrument different if the survey is clearly 
associated with politics? Procedurally, we front loaded half 
of the surveys with the “politics module” (treatment) and 
placed these directed political questions at the end of the 
survey for the other half of survey respondents (control).18 
Every respondent was eventually asked political questions, 
so if the hypothesized mechanism is correct, the survey 
itself heightened concerns over regime surveillance in both 
the treatment and control group. The advantage of the ran-
domization of module order is that one can observe if 
Georgian respondents perform differently on surveys they 
know to be collecting political behavior data compared to 
surveys where this was suspected but not known.
The dependent variable in the analysis that follows is the 
number of questions that the respondent answered “Don’t 
Know” or refused to answer.19 The average treatment effect 
for the full sample can be seen in Table 4. Asking political 
questions in the first part of the survey increased the num-
ber of “Don’t Know” or “Refuse To Answer” responses by 
an average of 1.7, which does not reach standard levels of 
statistical significance.
Given that a variety of mechanisms could explain how 
priming politics could induce higher rates of non-response, 
we are particularly interested in heterogeneous treatment 
effects: is non-response attributable to treatment higher in 
precincts with greater distrust of Georgian political insti-
tutions and the ruling party? A complication is that it is 
not possible to use individuals’ responses to a question as 
a covariate: all answers are “post-treatment.” Since the 
thrust of our argument is that respondents are reluctant 
about providing data and answer questions strategically, 
examining heterogeneity by individual response risks 
conflating treatment with baseline characteristics. 
Ecological inference provides a partial solution to this 
problem: creating covariates, at a precinct level, based on 
aggregates of survey responses that could divide precincts 
transparently.20 It becomes possible to make generaliza-
tions about which communities are essentially UNM 
strongholds and which communities do not believe that 
Georgia is a democracy.21 Table 5 splits the sample by the 
median value of the community level covariates and 
then displays the average treatment effect within each 
stratum.
Citizens were less likely to give answers to questions 
on the politics-loaded version of the survey (treatment) in 
precincts where many citizens also report they are not liv-
ing in a democracy, they don’t trust the electoral process, 
and they are mistrustful of the UNM.22 The specific ques-
tions with the the largest difference in non-response rates 
across the treatment and control conditions also support 
the favored hypothesis.23 The five questions with the larg-
est gap in response rates when the politics module was put 
at the front of the survey are as follows, in descending 
order:
Table 4. The average effect of question order on non-response. Treatment respondents were asked political questions at the 
beginning of the survey.
“Refuse” + “Don’t Know” “Refuse” “Don’t Know”
ATE 1.7 0.85 0.85
SE 1.14 0.62 0.97
95% CI (–0.53, 3.92) (–0.37, 2.06) (–1.04, 2.74)
n 2378 2378 2378
Table 5. Heterogeneity in the effect of question order.
Covariate “Georgia is a Democracy” “Elections Conducted Well” “Close to the UNM”
Stratum Below median Above median Below median Above median Below median Above median
ATE 4.03 –0.62 3.51 0.05 2.97 0.79
SE 1.83 1.46 1.77 1.47 1.75 1.54
95% CI (0.44,7.61) (–3.48, 2.24) (0.04, 6.98) (–2.84, 2.93) (–0.46, 6.4) (–2.22, 3.79)
n 1131 1151 1176 1169 1135 1155
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1. On a scale of 1 to 5 how do you feel about the fol-
lowing parties with “1” meaning “Very Negatively,” 
and “5” being “Very Positively”: [Answer: The 
Alliance for Georgia Opposition Party]
2. It has been proposed that closed circuit TV cameras 
be installed outside the polling stations to count the 
number of voters. Do you support this proposal?
3. On a scale from 1 to 5 where “1” means “Totally 
Falsified” and “5” means “Conducted Very Well” how 
do you think the local elections will be conducted?
4. On a scale of 1 to 5 how do you feel about the fol-
lowing parties with “1” meaning “Very Negatively” 
and “5” being “Very Positively”: [Answer: The We 
Ourselves Opposition Party]
5. On a scale from 1 to 5 where “1” means “Do Not 
Trust At All” and “5” means “Trust Completely,” 
how would you assess your trust towards domestic 
election observers?
In line with our theoretical expectations, front loading the 
survey with political questions most powerfully affected non-
response rates on questions related to monitoring of electoral 
practices, the credibility of the electoral process, and feelings 
about opposition parties. The first and fourth largest gap in 
response rates were questions that asked respondents to rate 
particular opposition parties (Alliance for Georgia was a coa-
lition of opposition parties backing the main opposition can-
didate in the Tbilisi 2010 mayoral race; We Ourselves was a 
single-issue opposition party focusing on the Abkhazia dis-
pute). The three other questions with large gaps refer to the 
credibility of the electoral process—with particular reluc-
tance about monitoring, either via cameras and digital record-
ing devices or domestic election observers. We interpret this 
pattern as additional circumstantial evidence that the more the 
survey veered into questions of politics, the less willing 
Georgian citizens were to reveal their opinions.
All of this may, in part, explain why neither area experts 
nor Georgians themselves predicted that Saakashvili’s UNM 
party would be outmaneuvered in the 2012 election by 
Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream.  Mullen (2012) 
reports that 46% of people contacted for a NDI-funded pre-
election survey in the immediate lead-up to the 2012 elec-
tion refused to tell CRRC survey enumerators who they 
were planning to vote for. He speculates: “[T]hat number 
was based on fear; and fear had become an important part of 
life under the UNM for many people. It was a fear that 
would lead people to avoid taking risks that could have put 
them on the wrong side of the authorities.” But it is impor-
tant to remember that is also plausible that respondents sim-
ply did not see themselves in solidarity with foreign-funded 
democracy professionals doing surveys. While fear is the 
mechanism that we find most intuitive—and a mechanism 
that fits neatly into both the rationalist voting framework 
and anti-regime polemics—other psychological mecha-
nisms are plausible. Simple disgust is difficult to falsify, and 
broadly consistent with the heterogeneous treatment effects 
reported above. As Nodia’s epigraph to this paper makes 
clear, politics in Georgia are widely viewed as dirty work.24 
The tendency to perceive politicians as corrupt, and respond 
negatively and emotionally to misused political power, is 
ubiquitous in democracies around the globe. The desire by 
Georgian respondents to avoid dirtying themselves with 
politics by avoiding it as much as possible could explain the 
behaviors reported in this study.
Conclusion
In recent years a number of studies have used natural and 
field experiments to demonstrate that the presence of interna-
tional actors—as election monitors, scientific observers, or 
activists—can have a causal influence on local electoral out-
comes. Unfortunately, as this study emphasizes, it is likely 
that well-meaning interventions are occasionally misinter-
preted. And while we are certain that our intervention inter-
acted in an unexpected way with prevalent beliefs in Georgian 
society, we emphasize that our study does not allow us to dis-
tinguish precisely which inherited beliefs interacted with the 
interventions to reduce turnout. Did the intervention acciden-
tally prime fear of regime monitoring? Or did it accidentally 
activate ambivalence, reminding respondents of some other 
distasteful aspect of Georgian political life? Future research 
may be able to discover the mechanism at work.
The Rose Revolution is an exemplary case of civil society 
actors nonviolently seizing control of the state apparatus. One 
of the unforeseen consequences was a blurring of the boundary 
of where the regime ends and civil society begins. Well-
meaning efforts by foreigners to strengthen civil society, in this 
context, were likely interpreted by many Georgians as strength-
ening the state. While this study provides limited grounds for 
generalization beyond the Georgian case, or even beyond the 
Saakashvili era, inherited beliefs from the Soviet legacy—a 
culture of bureaucratic compliance that is exploited by incum-
bent parties, expectations that private behaviors can and will be 
monitored and reported to authorities, and a sense that the polit-
ical sphere is “dirty”—are ubiquitous in the region.25 Residual 
fear of state surveillance is a common phenomenon in post-
authoritarian societies. This study should be seen as an invita-
tion for further research on how authoritarian cultural legacies 
interact with the standard social science toolkit.
Unexpected results are not unusual in the nascent field 
experimental literature on democracy promotion and elec-
tion observation. Hyde (2010), for example, reports the 
results of a randomized evaluation of election observers in 
Indonesia, where she found that precinct visits by interna-
tional observers increased the vote share of the incumbent 
presidential candidate by 32%. Hyde (2010: 521) proposes 
several possible explanations, but underscores that the spe-
cific result is “somewhat idiosyncratic” and unanticipated. 
In a voter mobilization experiment in Uganda, Ferree et al. 
(2011) unexpectedly found that increasing the salience of 
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the visibility of voting suppressed turnout, particularly 
among women. These results highlight one of the strengths 
of field experiments in that they enable researchers to 
uncover unanticipated effects of interventions. But these 
results also point to our incomplete knowledge about how 
interventions common in democracy promotion activities 
interact with local political practices and cultural beliefs.
This study has policy implications. Investments in 
improving the secrecy of the ballot—and then funding a 
public information campaign to publicize this fact—would 
probably indirectly empower opposition parties by reduc-
ing the perceived risks from regime surveillance. But pri-
marily these findings represent a sobering reminder that 
U.S. policy ambitions outstrip the current state of knowl-
edge on how foreign assistance can alter the relationship 
between the state and civil society. A healthy dose of humil-
ity is justified. While aggregate analysis of democratization 
aid have found positive effects on democracy indices 
(Finkel et al., 2008), our results suggest that the conse-
quences of any particular program can be highly heteroge-
neous and dependent on hard-to-measure local factors, 
particularly in countries just emerging from long bouts of 
authoritarian rule. There is much that we do not know about 
the technologies used by electoral authoritarian regimes to 
conduct elections in an environment that keeps citizens 
insecure, atomized, and dependent on the party in power.
Supplementary Material
The replication file is available at: http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/
dv/researchandpolitics
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Notes
 1. Arguments from psychology and sociology have been for-
malized, tested, and refined to enrich this rationalist account. 
For a synthesis and formalization of the literature on voter 
behavior in fully consolidated democracies see Gerber et al. 
(2008). Brody and Page (1973) and Anderson and Glomm 
(1992) discuss the decision to abstain strategically rather 
than vote for an “alienating” party in the American context.
 2. The journalist Thomas Friedman often told the following 
joke: “A minister goes to the Syrian dictator Hafez Assad 
after a national election. Minister: I have excellent news, Mr. 
President! You won 98.6% of the vote in the election! Less 
than 2% of the people dissented! What more could you pos-
sibly want? Assad: Their names.” Like much black humor, it 
draws attention to a set of rational fears that are not remotely 
funny for citizens born into authoritarian rule. This intuition 
is formalized in Stokes (2005), who provides a seminal model 
that parameterizes machine ability to monitor individual vote 
choice. For the related model of “turnout buying,” see Nichter 
(2008). See also Wedeen (1999) Chapters 1 and 6.
 3. The evocative phrase “ritual of consent” is borrowed from 
Heathershaw (2009: 95).
 4. Jones (2013: 136–139) reports that between 1992 and 2010 
Georgia received $3.37 billion in U.S. aid. Jones (2013: 244) 
notes that after its war with Russia over disputed secession-
ist territories in the summer of 2008, the United States was 
quick to pledge Georgia $1 billion in reconstruction and 
development aid, and the European Commission promised 
$500 million more. At the time that this study was conducted, 
it was common for political scientists to describe Georgia as 
an electoral authoritarian (Linz, 2000) or competitive author-
itarian (Levitsky and Way, 2002) political system. Still, 
the year before the experiment was implemented, the 2007 
“Nations in Transition” data from Freedom House—which 
ranks every post-Socialist nation on a 1–8 scale from most to 
least democratic on 8 different dimensions—rated Georgia at 
4.68, the most democratic of the eight post-Soviet states of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus (the average score of all eight 
states in this region was 5.96).
 5. The late Shevardnadze era was eloquently described as 
“Potemkin Democracy” by King (2001). The events of the 
Rose Revolution are described in Wheatley (2005: 181–
209). See also De Wall (2005), Nodia and Scholtbach (2006), 
Areshidze (2007), and Wheatley and Zürcher (2008).
 6. When votes were counted after the 2008 Parliamentary elections, 
the UNM, controlled 119 seats in the 150 member parliament—
a very comfortable cushion of safety above the 100 votes that 
would be necessary to rewrite the constitution. The second larg-
est faction—the United Opposition, consisting of eight small 
parties and a few individual politicians—had only 17 seats.
 7. As shall be discussed below, the percentage of respondents in 
a particular voting precinct that believed it was widespread 
varied substantially. 23% of survey respondents in the aver-
age precinct in the study reported that these beliefs were 
widespread, with a standard deviation of 22—which is to 
say, in some precincts no one reported this fear and in others 
it was the majority belief.
 8. For a lurid English-language account of how UNM tactics 
were portrayed at the time, see Fairbanks (2012).
 9. Certificates were distributed prior to elections for electric-
ity, fuel, or food, with the implied caveat that they could be 
invalidated by opposition victory at a district level.
10. The survey was conducted by the Caucasus Research 
Resource Centers (CRRC) as part of their Data Initiative, 
which seeks to gather comparable, nationally representative 
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household survey data from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia. 1837 individuals participated in the survey, with 
921 (50.14%) reporting that they believed their vote was 
secret, 345 (18.78%) reporting that they believed it was not 
secret, and 501 (27.27%) reporting that they didn’t know. 
The remaining 70 individuals either refused to answer or did 
not complete the survey.
11. A second intervention encouraged voters to check the public 
voter rolls in the lead-up to the election, to ensure that their 
and their families’ registration status was accurate. This sec-
ond intervention was only implemented in urban areas and in 
fewer precincts. Results from this intervention are presented 
in the Appendix.
12. According to the 2008, Georgian households have an aver-
age 3.5 members, but this figure includes children.
13. Electoral statistics are from the Georgian Central Electoral 
Commission. The President’s party vote share is for candi-
dates of the UNM running for the single member district tier 
of the national legislature.
14. This estimation procedure is equivalent to inverse propensity 
score weighting with a known propensity score. Unlike most 
applications using inverse propensity score weighting, unbi-
asedness of the estimator is guaranteed in this case because 
the true propensity score—the sampling weights—are known 
ex ante (Tsiatis, 2006).
15. These activities are almost always assumed to benefit the 
regime (Tucker, 2007; Sjoberg, 2012).
16. The variables “political pressure by employer,” and “percent 
reporting pressure to campaign,” are aggregated from pre-
treatment survey data. The variables are the percentage of 
survey respondents that said the following phenomena are 
widespread: “Voters feeling they have to vote a specific way 
to keep their jobs,” and “Employers forcing employees to 
take part in a campaign.”
17. For these variables, with the exception of urban–rural, 
we split the sample into “high” and “low” samples by the 
median. For subsample treatment effect estimates, we used 
point estimates and their associated standard errors from a 
regression model that allows the treatment effect to vary with 
a binary interaction variable:
y T Z Z Ti i i i i i= ( )0 1 2 3α β β β γ+ + + × + + ′ +Xi 
In this equation, Zi  is the dummy indicator variable for 
the subgroup, Ti  is an indicator for selection into treatment, 
and ′Xi  is a vector of covariates.
18. The politics module for the 2010 local election contained 
a standard battery of questions that contemporary political 
scientists working in comparative political behavior use to 
make inferences about likely voter behavior: questions about 
past voting history, intended vote choice in the upcoming 
elections, and the like.
19. This analysis excludes “cascade” questions that were only 
asked of respondents who answered in a particular way to 
a previous question. Summary statistics for the dependent 
variable can be found in the Appendix.
20. When using individual level data to estimate heterogeneous 
treatment effects, the same general patterns are found.
21. The questions used to construct the community level vari-
ables are: “In your opinion, is Georgia a democracy now?”; 
“On a scale of 1 to 5, where ‘1’ means ‘Totally Falsified’ 
and ‘5’ means ‘Conducted Very Well’ how do you think the 
local elections will be conducted?”; “Which party is clos-
est to you?” Community level variables are the fraction of 
respondents who answered that Georgia was a democracy, 
the fraction that rated the elections as a “3” or above, and the 
fraction that stated that the UNM (Saakashvili’s party) was 
closest to them. Descriptive statistics for the community-
level covariates can be found in Table 10 in the Appendix.
22. The treatment effect is statistically significant at the 5% level 
in two of the three substrata and statistically significant at the 
10% level for the third. The interaction (i.e. the difference 
between the above and below median strata) is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the case of the “Georgia is a 
Democracy” comparison and significant at the 10% level in 
the “Elections Conducted Well” comparison.
23. Treatment effects on individual questions are generally 
small, even for the five questions with the largest difference 
in response rates. The treatment effect on nonresponse for 
these five questions was about 4%. While small in absolute 
terms, the average non-response rate among control respond-
ents was about 8%, making the treatment effect an increase 
of about 50% over baseline.
24. For a description of politics as “dirty,” see Wheatley (2005: 
180).
25. For a historically grounded explanation of why a wide 
stratum of Georgian voters tend to see politics as dirty, see 
Wheatley (2005: 5). For ethnographic observations on post-
totalitarian behaviors, see Paxson (2005) and Harris (2004).
26. The restriction to urban precincts for the voters list interven-
tion was determined before randomization.
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To examine the effects of our intervention we employ multi-
ple sets of data: administrative data (collected at the precinct 
level) and individual panel survey data (aggregated to the pre-
cinct level). Administrative data includes voting behaviors, 
changes to the voter lists, and registered official complaints of 
election day malfeasance. Panel data provides a rich set of 
variables that we can employ to probe hypothesized causal 
mechanisms. We aggregate the survey data to the precinct 
level, which allows us to examine treatment effect interac-
tions with theoretically interesting pre-treatment covariates.
Electoral statistics are from the Georgian Central 
Electoral Commission and complaints data was compiled 
by from the electoral authorities and various election moni-
toring NGOs. The President’s party vote share is for candi-
dates of the UNM running for the single member district 
tier of the national legislature.
We present treatment effect results for a number of 
distinct dependent variables: a dummy variable for 
whether a complaint was filed with accusations of elec-
toral malfeasance in a precinct, the total number of com-
plaints, three different measures of whether a district had 
changes to the voter list, voter turnout by district, and 
percentage of votes received by the president’s party by 
district. To estimate the average effect of each interven-
tion on these variables, we employ a simple linear regres-
sion of the outcome variable on a treatment indicator, a 
vector of covariates (in some specifications), and block 
dummy variables:
y Ti i i i= 0 1α β γ+ + ′ +X 
where yi  is a variable measuring electoral outcomes 
(complaints, voter list changes, turnout, or vote share) in 
precinct i. Ti  is an indicator variable for either the com-
plaints or voters list treatment, the β1  coefficient captures 
the average impact of each intervention on the experimen-
tal population. Xi  is a vector of covariates (including 
block indicators) and i  is an unobserved error term. For 
the specifications that include covariates, the adjustment 
variables (by precinct) are the number of registered voters, 
voter turnout in 2006, and vote share of the president’s 
party in 2006. In each case we present unadjusted and 
adjusted results. The standard errors for the regression esti-
mates are calculated using White’s heteroskedasticity- 
consistent estimator. 
Map of treatment and control precincts
A visual depiction of precincts assigned to treatment and 
control groups in the “Complaints” field experiment can be 
found in Figure 2.
 by guest on December 11, 2014rap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Driscoll and Hidalgo 11
Balance statistics
While randomization ensures unbiased treatment effects in 
expectation, any given realization of the treatment assign-
ment may result in chance differences across treatment and 
control groups. To check that randomization adequately 
balanced background characteristics in both treatment con-
ditions, we present the treatment effect of both the voters 
list intervention and the complaints intervention on 
Treatment
Control
Figure 2. Map of treatment and control precincts for the “Complaints” field experiment.
Table 6. Balance Statistics for the 2008 field experiment.
Covariate Complaints treatment Voter list treatment
Registered voters (2007) 33.14 50.33
 (52.3) (65.88)
% turnout (2006) 0.02 –0.92
 (2.01) (2.34)
% vote for presidential party (2006) –0.55 –3.42
 (1.81) (2.08)
Pre-treatment non-response % 0 0.05
 (0.03) (0.04)
% saying employer pressure is widespread 0.06 0.03
 (0.04) (0.06)
% believing Georgia not a democracy 0 –0.01
 (0.03) (0.05)
% believing ballot stuffing is widespread 0.01 0.04
 (0.03) (0.05)
% believing officials biased to one party 0.02 0.05
 (0.03) (0.05)
% believing voter harassment is widespread 0.01 0.05
 (0.03) (0.05)
% believing activist harassment is widespread 0.01 0.05
 (0.03) (0.04)
Table shows covariate balance on selected pre-treatment covariates for both the complaints intervention (N = 84) and the voters list intervention  
(n = 48). Point estimates are from a regression with a treatment dummy and block fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedas-
ticity consistent.
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10 pre-treatment covariates in Table 6. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. There were no statistically sig-
nificant differences between the treatment and control 
groups on any of the covariates.
For the “Survey as an Experiment” design, we have only 
a limited set of variables to check balance. Fortunately, 
these variables are pre-treatment values of the outcome 
variables. These are presented in Table 7. None of the esti-
mated differences across the treatment and control condi-
tions are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Voters list intervention results
The intent of the “Voters List” treatment was to encourage 
voters to check their district voters list and make modifica-
tions if errors were found. To check if our intervention had 
this effect, we used the complete national voter registration 
database to track any alterations to existing entries in the 
voter registry by precinct (such changes in address, updat-
ing erroneous information, removing names, or the like). 
We examined three dependent variables: (a) the percent of 
voters list entries that were altered at any point in the post-
treatment period, but before the election; (b) the percent of 
voters list entries altered in the week after the intervention 
(as recorded on 4 and 5 May); and (c) the percent of voters 
list entries altered immediately before the election, as 
recorded on 11 and 12 May. Results are presented in 
Table 8. Due to logistical constraints, the voters list inter-
vention could only be administered in urban precincts, so 
consequently these estimates are substantially less precise 
than those from the complaints experiment and are not gen-
eralizable to non-urban areas.26 On average, the voters list 
intervention, when administered without the complaints 
message, induced an increase of about 0.3–0.4% to the 
voter registry over the entire post-treatment period. These 
estimates, however, are generally not statistically signifi-
cant, with the exception of the covariate adjusted estimated 
effect on “Early Changes” (significant at the 10% level). 
The effect appears to be concentrated in the days immedi-
ately after the intervention as the “Early Changes” coeffi-
cients are substantially larger than the “Late Changes” 
coefficients.
Table 7. Balance statistics for “Survey as an Experiment” results.
Previous turnout % Previous pres. Party vote %
2008 2010 2008 2010
Estimate –2.26 –1.14 –0.02 –2.47
SE 2.27 3.21 0.02 3.04
95% CI (–6.71, 2.19) (–7.42, 5.14) (–0.06, 0.01) (–8.42, 3.48)
N 2994 3101 2994 3101
This table shows the balance statistics for the “Survey as an Experiment” results. “Previous turnout” is turnout in the election prior to the survey. 
“Previous pres. Party vote” is vote share of president’s party in election prior to the survey. Estimates account for unequal probability of selection 
and control for precinct size, the variable used to sample precincts into the “treatment.”
Table 8. The average treatment effect of the complaints treatment on changes to the voters list. For covariate adjusted results, 
the adjustment variables are number of registered voters, 2006 turnout, and 2006 vote share of the ruling party. Standard errors 
are heteroskedasticity consistent and account for blocking.
Any changes Early changes Late changes
1 2 3 4 5 6
Voters list treatment 0.29 0.44 0.26 0.36a 0.04 0.07
 (0.41) (0.35) (0.21) (0.20) (0.26) (0.23)
Covariates  
N 48 48 48 48 48 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
aSignificant at p<.10.
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Additional tables 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for 2008 experiment.
Statistic N Mean St. dev. Min Max
Any Change to the Voters List 84 2.318 1.562 0.000 7.840
Registered Voters (April 17, 2008) 84 1141.048 333.761 266 1564
% turnout (2006) 84 47.155 16.314 20 90
% vote for presidential party (2006) 84 73.679 12.938 35 100
% registration changes 1 week after intervention 84 1.478 1.012 0.000 5.312
% registration changes 2 weeks after intervention 84 0.839 0.888 0.000 4.858
% turnout (2008) 84 50.805 15.274 7.712 95.342
% vote for presidential party (2008) 84 47.292 17.839 13.929 87.228
% reporting political pressure by Employers widespread 83 0.235 0.222 0.000 1.000
% reporting employers force employees to campaign 83 0.186 0.197 0.000 0.688
Number of registered voters (election day) 84 1254.881 361.711 269 1922
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for the 2010 survey.
Statistic N Mean St. dev. Min Max
Treatment 2,378  0.488  0.500 0   1
# of “Refuse to Answer” 2378 10.579 23.800 0 144
# of “Don’t Know” 2378 32.605 30.027 0 195
Closest to the UMN 2378  0.393  0.488 0   1
Believes Georgia is a democracy 2378  0.347  0.476 0   1
Voted for Saakashvili 2378  0.493  0.500 0   1
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